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I. INTRODUCTION 
If you use your fingerprint to unlock your mobile phone, you are not 
alone.  The number of phones with embedded fingerprint sensors is 
projected to grow from 499 million in 2015 to 1.6 billion in 2020.1  By 
2019, fifty percent of smartphones are expected to integrate an embedded 
fingerprint sensor.2  And fingerprints are just the beginning—automated 
facial recognition, hand gesture recognition, iris scanners, hand-vein 
scanners, and heart rhythm monitors are all vying to be “the next big 
thing.”3 
Many consumers view fingerprint identification as a secure way to 
protect the sensitive information they keep on their mobile devices.4  To 
alleviate security concerns, phone companies assure consumers that their 
fingerprint data is not transmitted from their phones and is processed 
separate from the operating system.5  However, the security risks from 
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fingerprint identification are growing with its rise in popularity.  Data 
breaches are growing more common,6 and during a major breach at the 
U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2014, the fingerprint data of 5.6 
million people was stolen.7  Lifted fingerprints8 or molds of users’ 
fingerprints can fool fingerprint readers.9  Some smartphones do not 
properly encrypt your fingerprint data and others do not have properly 
protected fingerprint sensors.10  As the breach at the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management demonstrates, when biometric information is 
collected and stored in a database, there is always the possibility of that 
information being stolen and subsequently used.  As one commentator has 
noted: “It’s easy to replace a swiped credit card, but good luck changing 
the patterns on your iris.”11 
Despite the popularity of biometrics and the unique issues they pose, 
there is no generally applicable federal law that regulates the private 
sector’s collection and use of biometric information in the United States.  
Only three states have enacted statutes governing biometric information 
privacy.12  The current lack of regulation is surprising given that biometric 
information is permanent and unique to each individual and thus creates a 
concern for identity theft.  Additionally, consumers do not have any 
control over the collection of their biometric information or knowledge of 
what is collected and by whom. 
This Comment will argue that a federal law governing biometric data 
privacy is necessary because biometric characteristics are increasing in 
popularity as a form of identification, are permanent and cannot be 
changed like other forms of identification, and the few state laws 
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01_3_3.pdf. 
 10.   Kevin Downey, Fingerprint Sensors: Are They Really Secure?, KOMANDO.COM (Feb. 15, 
2016), http://www.komando.com/happening-now/347464/fingerprint-sensors-are-they-really-secure/ 
all. 
 11.   Biometric Security Poses Huge Privacy Risks, SCI. AM., (Jan. 1, 2014), 
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implemented are inconsistent and have created uncertainty for businesses 
regarding compliance.  Part II will explain the background of biometric 
technology, outline the current framework of U.S. federal and state laws 
related to biometric information collection, and summarize current privacy 
developments between the United States and the European Union.  Part III 
will argue that a federal law that explicitly delegates enforcement power 
to the Federal Trade Commission will provide consistent protection for 
consumers and will ensure continued transatlantic commerce between the 
United States and the European Union.  The Fair Credit Reporting Act will 
serve as a template for a federal biometric information privacy law.  
Finally, Part IV will conclude that the current privacy protections in place 
are insufficient and that a federal biometric information privacy statute 
will provide sufficient protection of consumers’ biometric information. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The private industry’s collection and use of biometric information is 
largely unregulated in the United States.13  The mass collection of 
biometric information has expanded rapidly in the past decade, but the law 
has not kept up.14  The United States has yet to pass privacy legislation 
that adequately protects consumers, who have little to no control over what 
biometric information companies collect, how they collect it, or how it is 
stored and used after collection.15  This Section provides an overview of 
the basics of biometric technology and the current legal landscape of 
biometric privacy protections in the United States 
A. Biometric Information: The Technology 
According to a market research report by Application, Technology, 
Function, & Geography, “the biometrics market is expected to reach 
$32.73 billion by 2022.”16  Another market research report predicts the 
mobile biometrics market to grow at an even faster rate, reaching $49.33 
                                                          
 13.   Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1041, 1080–81 (2013). 
 14.   See Biometric Security Poses Huge Privacy Risks, supra note 11 (“Current law is not even 
remotely prepared to handle these [biometric technology] developments.  The legal status of most 
types of biometric data is unclear.”). 
 15.   See McKenna, supra note 13, at 1081. 
 16.   Biometric System Market by Authentication Type (Single-Factor: (Fingerprint, IRIS, Palm 
Print, Face, Vein, Signature, Voice), Multi-Factor), Component (Hardware and Software), Function 
(Contact and Non-Contact), Application, and Region - Global Forecast to 2022, 
MARKETSANDMARKETS (Nov. 2016), http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/next-
generation-biometric-technologies-market-697.html. 
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billion by 2022.17  To understand how biometric technology has become 
so popular in the private industry, it is helpful to understand what 
biometrics are, how they work, and the benefits they provide to consumers 
and businesses. 
To put it simply, biometrics are biological measurements.18  The term 
“biometrics” refers to one or more distinguishing biological characteristic 
of an individual.19  A biometric characteristic is a measureable 
physiological or behavioral trait that may be used to identify an 
individual.20  Thus, biometric characteristics can be broken down further 
into two categories: physiological characteristics and behavioral 
characteristics.21  Physiological characteristics are those that concern the 
body’s composition and measurements.22  Examples include hand 
geometry, fingerprints, DNA, and face, retina, iris, or ear features.23  
Behavioral characteristics concern a person’s behavior.24  Behavioral 
characteristics are measurable patterns such as typing rhythm, gait, and 
voice, which can be used to continuously identify an individual.25 
The term “biometrics” is also used to describe a system.26  A biometric 
system is the process of recognizing an individual based on a measurable 
physiological or behavioral characteristic.27  Biometric systems consist of 
three basic components: first, a device that captures the biometric 
characteristic; second, “software to convert the [] scanned biometric data 
into a standardized digital format and to compare [relevant] match points;” 
and third, “[a] database to securely store biometric data for comparison.”28  
                                                          
 17.   Mobile Biometrics Market Worth 49.33 Billion USD by 2022, MARKETSANDMARKETS, 
http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/mobile-biometric.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
 18.   See Definition: Biometrics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/biometrics (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (defining biometrics as “the 
measurement and analysis of unique physical or behavioral characteristics (such as fingerprint or voice 
patterns) especially as a means of verifying personal identity”). 
 19.   See Margaret Rouse, Definition: Biometric Verification, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/biometric-verification (last updated May 2008). 
 20.   FAQ – Biometrics, 360 BIOMETRICS, http://www.360biometrics.com/faq/biometrics.php 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2018).  
 21.   Margaret Rouse, Definition: Biometrics, SEARCHSECURITY [hereinafter Rouse, Biometrics], 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/biometrics (last updated Nov. 2015). 
 22.   Id. 
 23.   FAQ – Biometrics, supra note 20.  
 24.   Rouse, Biometrics, supra note 21. 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Salil Prabhakar et al., Biometric Recognition: Security and Privacy Concerns, IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 33, 33, http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/ 
Publications/GeneralBiometrics/PrabhakarPankantiJain_BiometricSecurityPrivacy_SPM03.pdf.  
 27.   Id.  For the purpose of this Comment, “biometrics” will be discussed as the utilization of 
physiological or behavioral characteristics for identification. 
 28.   Rouse, Biometrics, supra note 21. 
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The biometric information in the database is compiled as measurements, 
which are used to create an algorithm or a “template” of an individual’s 
specific biometric characteristic, such as their fingerprint or their facial 
features.29  Once an individual’s characteristic is in a database, it is 
compared to new records.30  Biometric authentication can then be used to 
either verify an individual’s identity, or to identify an unknown person.31  
If the new records match the database record, then that individual’s 
identity is confirmed: 
For example, when someone shows up at a security checkpoint claiming 
to be “John Doe,” that person’s biometrics are checked against the 
system which contains the biometrics of “John Doe,” and the system 
verifies that the person is in fact that particular “John Doe.” 
Alternatively, an unknown person’s biometrics can be checked against a 
database to determine who that person is, such as matching a fingerprint 
found at a crime scene to the FBI’s database.32 
Both the government and the private industry collect vast amounts of 
personal data, including biometric data.  Biometric data is unlike any other 
personal data collected about individuals; biometric characteristics are 
personal to each individual, permanent, and indispensable.33  While there 
is a need for regulation of the collection of personal data in general, the 
focus of this Comment is on biometric data because of its unique nature.  
Similarly, while the government was an early adopter of biometric 
technology and continues to collect vast amounts of biometric data on 
individuals today, the private industry’s collection and use of biometric 
data is almost entirely unregulated.34 
The private industry has created an environment in which data 
collection is a prevalent business practice and data is used for a wide 
variety of purposes.35  Its use of biometric identification quickly expanded 
                                                          
 29.   Carmen Aguado, Comment, Facebook or Face Bank?, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 187, 193 
(2012). 
 30.   Rouse, Biometrics, supra note 21. 
 31.   Erin M. Sales, Note, The “Biometric Revolution”: An Erosion of the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege to be Free from Self-Incrimination, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193, 213–14 (2014). 
 32.   Id. at 214. 
 33.   Natasha Kohne et al., Unique Biometric Data Creates Unique Privacy Concerns, N.Y.L.J. 
(Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202749996053/. 
 34.   The government’s collection of personal information is bound by the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, the Pen/Trap Statute, and the Stored Communications Act, among others.  For a 
discussion of these governmental restraints, see McKenna, supra note 13, at 1046–50. 
 35.   Gregory James Evans, Comment, Regulating Data Practices: How State Laws Can Shore 
Up the FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Breaches, Privacy, and More, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 187, 195 
(2015). 
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in recent years partially because of advancements in technology, but 
largely because of the advantages of biometric identification.36  Traditional 
methods of identification include passwords, personal identification 
numbers (PIN), driver’s licenses, passports, and, increasingly, social 
security numbers.37  While these methods have been used for years, they 
have unavoidable disadvantages.  For example, a password or PIN can be 
forgotten, a person may discover and use someone else’s social security 
number, and a driver’s license or passport can be lost or forged.38  
Alternatively, biometric identification is difficult to duplicate, cannot be 
lost, and does not depend on an individual to remember it because it is 
based on his or her “intrinsic characteristics.”39  Biometric characteristics 
are inherent and provide completely unique data sets that result in accurate 
data generation and verification.40  It is, in fact, these intrinsic 
characteristics that appeal so strongly to innovators. 
The advantages that biometrics provide have led to new innovations 
in identification technology.  For example, researchers have been able to 
identify individuals by measuring their brainwave patterns using an 
electroencephalogram (EEG) headset.41  Researchers at Binghamton 
University measured fifty individuals’ EEG responses to certain stimuli, 
like food and celebrities.42  The brain reactions were so unique that each 
“brainprint” was used to identify individuals with 100% accuracy.43  In the 
future, brainwave patterns could be used in security systems to verify an 
individual’s identity.44 
                                                          
 36.   See Scott M. Bernat, Biometrics: Enhancing Security in the Public and Private Sectors, ASIA 
PACIFIC SECURITY MAG. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.asiapacificsecuritymagazine.com/biometrics-
enhancing-security-in-the-public-and-private-sectors/. 
 37.   McKenna, supra note 13, at 1066.  See also Elizabeth M. Walker, Note, Biometric Boom: 
How the Private Sector Commodifies Human Characteristics, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 831, 842 (2015) (“Today, the Social Security number is considered the most valuable piece 
of information to a criminal because it is a ‘skeleton key’ for all accounts.”). 
 38.   McKenna, supra note 13, at 1066. 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Advantages of Biometrics, SUPERPAGES.COM, https://www.superpages.com/em/advantages-
of-biometrics/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
 41.   Maria V. Ruiz-Blondet et al., CEREBRE: A Novel Method for Very High Accuracy Event-
Related Potential Biometric Identification, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS AND SECURITY, 
July 2016, at 1618–19, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ielx7/10206/7447855/07435286.pdf?tp=&arnumber 
=7435286&isnumber=7447855. 
 42.   Id. at 1619. 
 43.   See id. at 1618.  (“Results indicate that there are multiple configurations of data collected . . . 
that all allow 100% identification accuracy in a pool of 50 users.”).  
 44.   Researchers Can Identify You by Your Brain Waves with 100 Percent Accuracy, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/04/160418120608.htm. 
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The private industry can, and does, “surreptitiously gather, collect, 
store, and sell vast amounts of intimate, personal data.”45  While the 
fundamental technology behind the devices we use has not changed in 
recent years, the scope of the collection of our information has become 
more complex and pervasive.46  The current privacy framework in the 
United States does not give individuals the power to protect their privacy 
by controlling the personal data gathered, collected, stored, and sold by 
the private industry.47  This is increasingly problematic, because the 
“private industry tracks 24/7 our physical location, online travels, friends, 
activities, likes and dislikes, preferences (including religious and sexual), 
personal status (married, divorced, or single), and financial status.  Such 
tracking is accomplished in myriad ways and, more increasingly, it is done 
using individuals’ biometric identifiers.”48  The next section will provide 
an overview of the legal framework surrounding biometric information 
privacy in the U.S. 
B. Collecting and Using Biometric Data: The Legal Landscape 
Thanks to the Internet and advancements in technology, the number 
of individuals and businesses connected worldwide is constantly 
increasing.49  As such, it is important to understand the legal landscape of 
biometric privacy law both in the United States and internationally.  While 
there are no federal statutes that directly regulate the collection and use of 
biometric information in the private sector, some states have enacted 
biometric information privacy laws.  Federal laws provide sector-specific 
protections that may overlap with collection of biometric information.  
Additionally, some businesses are constrained by the Privacy Shield, 
which is an agreement between the United States and the EU regarding 
additional protections that businesses must have in place to protect data 
privacy if they want to engage in business with the EU. 
1. Federal Laws and Regulations 
Though the United States is a world leader in data-driven business, 
current federal statutes do not comprehensively regulate the collection of 
                                                          
 45.   McKenna, supra note 13, at 1042. 
 46.   Evans, supra note 35, at 195–96. 
 47.   McKenna, supra note 13, at 1042. 
 48.   Id. at 1043. 
 49.   As of January 2018, there were roughly 3.8 billion Internet users in the world.  Internet 
Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018). 
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personal data via the Internet.50  Nor do they protect consumers from the 
collection of biometric data, despite requests from industry leaders for 
guidelines to protect individuals from the collection of their biometric data 
without their consent.51  There is no generally applicable federal law 
regulating the private industry’s collection, storage, use, purchasing and 
selling of biometric information.52  Instead, federal privacy law in the 
United States is a patchwork of statutes that do not sufficiently protect 
individuals’ biometric information privacy or give businesses a uniform 
law to follow.53 
Instead of one general statute regulating biometric data, or even data 
privacy generally, much of the current privacy legislation in the United 
States regulates specific areas—which means that very little legislation 
exists that specifically regulates data privacy.54  Unless a federal law 
regulating a certain industry provides restrictions on the collection and use 
of personal information, such as financial institutions, credit reporting 
agencies, and health care providers,55 consumers have very little protection 
absent additional protections provided under state law.  As a result, the 
United States has developed a sectoral approach,56 where data privacy 
                                                          
 50.   Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and 
Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 51.   Aguado, supra note 29, at 223. 
 52.   Nancy J. King & V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the Cloud? A 
Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security of Sensitive Consumer Data, 50 
AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 443 (2013). 
 53.   See Erin Corken, The Changing Expectation of Privacy: Keeping Up with the Millennial 
Generation and Looking Toward the Future, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 287, 294 (2015) (“Over the years in 
the U.S. . . . a sectoral approach to privacy regulation has developed.”). 
 54.   An example of these regulated areas are “consumer protection, records management in 
federal agencies, telecommunications, electronic communication, healthcare, banking and financial 
institutions, education, audio visual material rental, sale and subscription, electronic government 
services, children, and drivers that typically concern provisions regarding personal information and 
the safeguarding of it.”  Id. 
 55.   King & Raja, supra note 52, at 443–44 (citing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012)); Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1173, 110 Stat. 1936, 2024–25 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012)); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012))). 
 56.   One example of this sectoral approach is the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA).  
47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).  This statute applies to cable operators and service providers and is intended 
to protect cable subscribers’ privacy.  Cable operators and service providers are required to notify 
subscribers of the type of personal information that is collected and its uses, gain the written consent 
of subscribers before collecting information that could personally identify them, and allow subscribers 
to access their personal data.  Id. § 551(a)(1).  The CCPA gives consumers power over their data by 
ensuring transparency and allowing consumers to have knowledge about their personal data and what 
is done with it.  Consumers can prohibit or limit the disclosure of their names and addresses, and 
decline to consent to the disclosure of their personally identifiable information.  Id. § 551(c)(1).  
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protection is limited to specific types of information in limited 
circumstances.57  Various federal statutes regulate data collected from 
federal agency records,58 state motor vehicle records,59 video rental 
records,60 medical records,61 bank records,62 consumer reporting agency 
records,63 and ISP records.64  There are very few federal statutes that 
regulate Internet use and electronic communications.  Statutes that do 
regulate personal information collected via the Internet or electronic 
communications, such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act65 
or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,66 do not regulate the 
collection of biometric information.  The only direct regulation of 
biometric information collected by private entities is a requirement in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s regulations.67  
Specifically, “[b]iometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints” 
must be removed from protected health information to ensure it is not 
“individually identifiable health information.”68 
Notably missing from these statutes is a federal statute regulating 
Internet websites, data brokers, or the collection of biometric information 
by businesses.  The only biometric-related relief offered to consumers, 
albeit indirectly, is a possible conviction for aggravated identity theft for 
using their biometric information.69  There is no statute that directly 
protects consumers from the collection and use of their biometric 
information.  That being said, such a statute is certainly possible.  Some of 
                                                          
Additionally, the CCPA provides a private cause of action for consumers to recover from violations 
of the statute.  Id. § 551(f). 
 57.   Joshua J. McIntyre, Comment, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 895, 902 (2011). 
 58.   5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 59.   18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012). 
 60.   18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
 61.   42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012). 
 62.   15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012). 
 63.   15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 64.   18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3127 (2012). 
 65.   The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act regulates websites’ collection and use of 
children’s personal information by requiring parental consent.  15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012). 
 66.   The Electronic Communications Privacy Act is comprised of three acts: (1) the Wiretap Act, 
which regulates the interception of communications; (2) the Stored Communications Act, which 
regulates communications in storage and ISP subscriber records; and (3) the Pen Register Act, which 
regulates the use of pen register and trap and trace devices.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 
3121–3127. 
 67.   45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016). 
 68.   Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(P). 
 69.   See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1028(d)(7)(B) (2011).  See generally 18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A (Supp. 2017) 
(defining aggravated identity theft). 
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the same privacy concerns surrounding biometric characteristics were the 
impetus behind the creation of a statute that regulates genetic information. 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) was enacted 
in 2008 to protect individuals from discrimination based on their genetic 
information.70  GINA prohibits employers from discriminating against 
individuals because of their genetic information with regards to health 
insurance and employment.71  A large part of the drive behind the 
enactment of GINA was the “fears of misuse of genetic information[,]” 
which parallels the growing fear of the misuse of biometric information.72  
Supporters of GINA believed that scientific advancement in genetics 
could create a new way to discriminate against individuals.73  Despite the 
fact that genes are “facially neutral markers,” Congress found that some 
genetic conditions are associated with certain racial groups, ethnic groups, 
or genders and thus could be used to discriminate against or stigmatize 
specific groups of people.74  Congress also found that federal law 
governing genetic discrimination was “incomplete in both the scope and 
depth of its protections.”75  While some states had enacted their own laws 
prohibiting genetic discrimination, Congress found that the state laws 
varied on “approach, application, and level of protection” and were not 
only confusing but also did not protect the public from discrimination.76  
These same concerns underlie the collection of biometric data. 
Under Title II of GINA, employers are prohibited from using genetic 
information for the purpose of hiring or firing, offering promotions, 
determining salary, or employment privileges.77  Essentially, it is illegal 
“for your employer to use family health history and genetic test results in 
                                                          
 70.   Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 29 and 42 of the United States Code).  See Jessica 
L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 597, 599 (2011) (“Ultimately, [Congress] drafted GINA as civil rights legislation, 
intended to outlaw a burgeoning form of discrimination.  Specifically, GINA prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of genetic information . . . .”). 
 71.   Genetic Information, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/special-topics/genetic-information/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (“Title I of 
GINA prohibits discrimination based on genetic information in health coverage.  Title II of GINA 
prohibits discrimination based on genetic information in employment.”). 
 72.   LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 172.02[2][a] (Matthew 
Bender ed., 2d ed. 2017). 
 73.   Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 443 (2010). 
 74.   42 U.S.C. 2000ff note (GINA § 2(3)) (2012). 
 75.   Id. (GINA § 2(5)). 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   42 U.S.C. 2000ff-1(a). 
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making decisions about your employment.”78  Additionally, employers 
cannot compel or purchase genetic information of an employee or an 
employee’s family member except in a few limited circumstances.79  Any 
genetic information that is possessed by an employer must be treated as a 
confidential employee medical record.80  GINA also provides a private 
cause of action for employees for a violation dependent upon what other 
antidiscrimination statute covers the employee.81 
GINA provides protection from employment-related discrimination 
based on genetics, but it does not provide protection for related biometric 
information.  “Genetics” refers to the genetic makeup of an individual.82  
GINA defines genetic information as information about an individual’s 
genetic tests, a family member’s genetic tests, or “the manifestation of a 
disease or disorder” in a family member.83  Information about the sex or 
age of an individual is specifically excluded from the definition.84  Genetic 
information relates to biometric information in the sense that both can be 
characterized as “informatization of the body.”85  However, genetics 
generally involve DNA, while biometrics involve a broad scope of 
information ranging from fingerprints and facial recognition to hand 
geometry and iris recognition.86  GINA does not protect biometric 
information outside the scope of genetic testing and genetic diseases or 
disorders.  Additionally, GINA only protects consumers from 
discrimination in employment.  Consumers generally remain unprotected 
from the collection of their biometric information by private industries.87 
As GINA has shown, there is potential for federal statutes that protect 
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 80.   Id. § 2000ff-5(a). 
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 82.   Definition: Genetics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/genetics (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
 83.   42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 84.   Id. § 2000ff(4)(C). 
 85.   Irma van der Ploeg, Genetics, Biometrics, and the Informatization of the Body, ANN IST 
SUPER SANITA 2007, at 44, 44, http://www.iss.it/binary/publ/cont/STAMPA%20ANN_07_07 
%20VD%20Proeg.1180428381.pdf (describing “informatization of the body” as “a relatively new 
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 86.   See Types of Biometrics, BIOMETRIC INST., https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/types-of-
biometrics (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
 87.  Roberts, supra note 73, at 454–57. 
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biometric information.  Because none are currently in place, state law 
provides the most protection to individuals. 
2. State Biometric Privacy Law 
A handful of states have enacted state statutes governing biometric 
data collection.  Connecticut, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have regulated the collection of biometric 
information by defining “personal information” in data security breach 
notification laws to include types of biometric data.88  Illinois and Texas 
have implemented even further regulation of biometric data collection by 
creating statutes focusing solely on biometric data privacy.89  Washington 
recently followed suit, and on May 16, 2017, House Bill 1493 was signed 
into law, which broadly regulates the collection, retention, and use of 
“biometric identifiers.”90  These comprehensive statutes provide 
consumers more protection because they recognize that biometric 
information is inherent, distinct from other types of personal information, 
and potential harms are not limited to data security breaches.91  However, 
as discussed below, these statutes are ambiguous, conflicting, and pose 
significant challenges to businesses. 
Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) in 
2008, limiting private industry’s collection and use of biometric 
information.92  Under BIPA, private entities are required to notify 
                                                          
 88.   Daveante Jones, Comment, Protecting Biometric Information in Arkansas, 69 ARK. L. REV. 
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 89.   Jones, supra note 88, at 132. 
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LAW 360 (May 25, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/928056/the-next-steps-for-
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 91.   Jones, supra note 88, at 131. 
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individuals that their biometric information is being collected, obtain 
informed consent before collecting it, and destroy the information within 
a certain timeframe.93  BIPA also prohibits private entities from profiting 
from a consumer’s biometric information and requires publicly-available 
written policies concerning biometric data retention and destruction.94 
In 2009, Texas enacted a statute governing biometric information, the 
“Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier” (CUBI).95  Under CUBI, private 
entities cannot collect biometric information before giving notice and 
obtaining an individual’s consent.96  The statute also includes time 
limitations for storing and destroying biometric information.97 
CUBI and BIPA have some similarities, but a large number of 
differences.  Under both CUBI and BIPA, private entities can disclose an 
individual’s biometric information to a third party98 only if (1) the 
individual consents; (2) the disclosure completes a financial transaction 
the individual requested or authorized; (3) the disclosure is required by 
law; or (4) the disclosure is made in response to a warrant or subpoena.99 
BIPA creates a private right of action against private entities that do 
not follow requirements for the collection and use of biometric 
information.100  A prevailing party may recover $1,000 in damages per 
negligent violation and $5,000 per intentional or reckless violation.101  No 
private right of action exists under CUBI.  Instead, the statute permits the 
Texas Attorney General to bring a civil action and provides a penalty cap 
of $25,000 per violation.102  The statutes’ definitions of “biometric 
identifier” also differ.  BIPA defines a “biometric identifier” as a “retina 
or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry” and 
lists materials specifically excluded from the definition.103  Notably, 
                                                          
 93.   740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 § 15 (West 2010). 
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 96.   Id. § 503.001(b). 
 97.   Id. § 503.001(c)(3). 
 98.   740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 § 15(d); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(c)(1). 
 99.   Jones, supra note 88, at 135–36 (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 § 15(d); TEX. 
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 101.   740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20 § 20(1)–(2). 
 102.   Antonucci & Morgan, supra note 94. 
 103.   740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10 § 10. 
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physical descriptions and photographs are excluded from the definition.104  
CUBI defines a “biometric identifier” as a “retina or iris scan, fingerprint, 
voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry” but does not provide 
specific exclusions from the definition.105 
The plain language of each statute illuminates potential problems 
posed by multiple statutes offering similar but distinct protections to 
consumers.  First, conflicting definitions of “biometric identifier” creates 
risk for private entities conducting business primarily through the Internet.  
It is challenging for businesses to abide by various applicable state laws if 
they significantly differ.  For example, photographs are excluded under 
BIPA but included under CUBI.106  This creates ambiguity for businesses 
that collect information about consumers derived from photographs. 
As more states implement biometric information privacy statutes in 
the future, the difficulty of abiding by each individual definition will 
increase.  For example, California’s proposed definition of biometric 
information would extend to unique biological characteristics and the data 
generated by measuring them, as opposed to the more limited definitions 
under BIPA and CUBI.107  As a result of varying definitions, entities are 
at a higher risk of noncompliance and face significant penalties if found 
liable. 
Second, entities face varying high statutory penalties and potential 
class actions for violations under each statute.  A consolidated class action 
lawsuit against Facebook is illustrative of this issue.  The lawsuit alleges 
that Facebook’s Tag Suggestion feature violates BIPA because it collects 
and stores users’ facial geometry, a biometric identifier, without their 
knowledge or consent.108  Specifically, the plaintiffs argue “that they never 
authorized Facebook to collect their biometric information when someone 
‘tagged’ them in a photo, which allows the software to memorize their 
facial features and prompt users to identify them in other images.”109  
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Because BIPA authorizes penalties ranging from $1,000 to $5,000 per 
violation, this class action lawsuit could cost Facebook millions in 
damages if it is ultimately found liable.110 
While class action lawsuits are not an issue under CUBI, companies 
are still subject to penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, which can 
quickly escalate to the millions.111  Proposed statutes also threaten 
significant civil penalties.  A proposed statute in New York would allow 
civil penalties for knowing and reckless violations of up to $1,000 per 
person, up to a maximum of $50 million.112  The risk of exorbitant 
penalties and unclear standards will only increase as more states 
implement biometric privacy statutes.  This risk will continue to escalate 
as more companies enter the biometric technology domain.113 
3. The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
The United States does not have stringent federal or state data privacy 
regulations, but that does not mean that businesses do not have restrictions 
emanating from other sources.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has 
referred to the transatlantic flow of data as “the biggest advancement in 
trade facilitation since air travel.”114  The European Centre for 
International Political Economy and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
conducted a trade impact assessment of the General Data Privacy 
Regulation in 2013.115  That assessment concluded that “[c]ross-border 
data flows and the Internet serving as a marketplace or a distribution 
channel have enabled more cross-border trade, competition and 
innovation.”116  This rapid change has affected nearly every industry.117  
While the United States conducts transatlantic Internet-related business 
with numerous countries, this section focuses on the exchanges between 
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the European Union and the United States, which the trade impact 
assessment described as “the most important economic link in the 
world.”118 
The European Union has historically created stricter protections for 
the collection and use of personal data.  The EU Data Protection 
Directive119 was enacted in 1995 to “balance the protections for 
individuals’ privacy with the free movement of personal data within the 
EU.”120  An independent advisory panel, the Article 29 Working Party 
(WP29), was created under the Directive to give guidance to member 
states on issues regarding personal data processing and the free movement 
of data.121  In 2012, the WP29 adopted an opinion on developments in 
biometric technologies.122  At the outset, the opinion described the privacy 
harms that biometric technologies can produce: 
Biometric technologies are closely linked to certain characteristics of an 
individual and some of them can be used to reveal sensitive data.  In 
addition many of them allow for automated tracking, tracing or profiling 
of persons and as such their potential impact on the privacy and the right 
to data protection of individuals is high.  This impact is increasing 
through the growing deployment of these technologies.  Every individual 
is likely to be enrolled in one or several biometric systems.123 
The opinion went on to provide an updated framework of guidelines 
on the implementation of privacy principles in biometric technologies.124  
Biometric data is subject to the Directive framework, and cannot be 
processed unless a legal basis exists and the processing is “adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected.”125  Additionally, under the Directive, individuals must know 
that their biometric information is being collected and used.126  Individuals 
must be adequately informed about the type of data collected, the purposes 
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 119.   Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. 
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of its collection, who the data is disclosed to, and their right to access, 
correct, or remove their data.127  The opinion also emphasized security as 
a primary concern when collecting and using biometric data, and thus 
recommended “a high level of technical protection for the processing of 
biometric data, using the latest technical possibilities.”128 
Article 25(1) of the Data Protection Directive states that “the transfer 
to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are 
intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without 
prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to 
the other provisions of [the] Directive, the third country in question 
ensures an adequate level of protection.”129  Because of the United States’ 
patchwork and self-regulating privacy structure, it was found to provide 
inadequate data privacy protection and EU companies were prohibited 
from transferring personal data to the United States.130 
To bridge the vastly different legal approaches, the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles were formulated.131  The United States and the 
European Union developed the Safe Harbor Principles to serve as a self-
regulatory framework that would allow transatlantic data transfers while 
ensuring the requirements of EU data protection law was met.132  
Essentially, U.S. businesses could opt into a set of data protection 
safeguards and certify compliance with the Principles.133  However, in 
2015 the European Court of Justice held that the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles did not adequately protect data transferred to the U.S. and 
declared the Principles invalid.134 
Expedited negotiations led to an agreement on a new data privacy 
framework: the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.  Under the Privacy Shield, U.S. 
companies must commit to stringent obligations on “how personal data is 
processed and individual rights are guaranteed” and must publish their 
commitment.135  The United States committed to limiting access of public 
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authorities to data and excluding personal data transferred to the United 
States from “indiscriminate mass surveillance.”136  Additionally, the 
European Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce will 
conduct an annual joint review of the agreement.137  Finally, the agreement 
provides various redress avenues for EU citizens who believe their data 
has been misused by U.S. entities.138  Five months after the agreement was 
reached, the European Union officially adopted the Privacy Shield, 
“finding it to be adequate with respect to the processing of personal data 
from EU member states . . . to the US.”139 
The Privacy Shield will be popular among U.S. data importers.140  
Businesses who wish to join the Privacy Shield will be required to register 
and self-certify to the Department of Commerce and publicly commit to 
comply with the Privacy Shield.141  Once a company registers and self-
certifies, their commitment is “enforceable under US law and will remain 
enforceable regarding any personal data processed during the self-
certification period, even if a company is no longer a participating 
company.”142  To encourage U.S. businesses to certify early, the Privacy 
Shield gave a nine-month grace period to businesses that certified within 
two months of the August 1, 2016 effective date.143  During this grace 
period, businesses had time to “bring their existing contracts with onward 
transfer recipients” into compliance with the new framework.144  
Companies that waited to certify “must have all of their shield-related 
onward transfer agreements in place on the date of certification.”145 
While the self-certification process ensures that U.S. businesses can 
continue transatlantic business with the European Union, the process itself 
is not simple.  To assist businesses considering joining the Privacy Shield, 
the Department of Commerce issued a guide to self-certification.146  The 
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guide instructs businesses to (1) confirm eligibility to participate in the 
Privacy Shield, (2) develop a Privacy Shield compliant privacy policy, (3) 
provide a free complaint investigation mechanism, (4) ensure that a 
verification mechanism is in place to verify compliance with the 
framework, and (5) provide contract information for any issues that may 
arise under the Privacy Shield.147  The guide seems relatively simple, 
however, companies “need to be undertaking privacy impact assessments 
to analyze what personally identifiable information is collected, used, 
processed and shared, understand and appropriately remediate compliance 
gaps, and make intelligent risk-related decisions with the next two- to 
three-year horizon in mind.”148 
The Privacy Shield is a step in the right direction for the United 
States.  However, its protections are not directly intended for U.S. 
citizens.149  The purpose of the agreement was to establish adequate 
safeguards in the United States so that data transfers to the European 
Union provide equivalent data protection standards as in the EU.150  While 
the U.S. government is willing to work to establish data protections for 
other countries’ citizens, it has lagged in providing those same protections 
to Americans.  The next section outlines a framework that would provide 
adequate privacy protection to Americans while maintaining the high 
standards necessary for commerce between the United States and the 
European Union. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Biometric information creates unique problems for consumers and is 
not adequately regulated in the United States.  To address these problems, 
a federal biometric information privacy statute should be enacted to 
provide consumers with adequate protection and to grant regulatory power 
to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  As discussed below, this statute 
should be modeled on the Fair Credit Reporting Act and should broadly 
apply to the private industry’s collection and use of biometric information. 
A. The Problems 
The advantages of biometric identification have become more 
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apparent as the technological boom and rise of the internet has allowed 
retailers to track and gather vast amounts of data on individuals.  Without 
even resorting to biometric information, almost any retailer can buy or 
learn information regarding: 
Your age, whether you are married and have kids, which part of town 
you live in, how long it takes you to drive to the store, your estimated 
salary, whether you’ve moved recently, what credit cards you carry in 
your wallet and what Web sites you visit.  Target can buy data about your 
ethnicity, job history, the magazines you read, if you’ve ever declared 
bankruptcy or got divorced, the year you bought (or lost) your house, 
where you went to college, what kinds of topics you talk about online, 
whether you prefer certain brands of coffee, paper towels, cereal or 
applesauce, your political leanings, reading habits, charitable giving and 
the number of cars you own.151 
In addition to the information retailers can learn through online 
tracking and purchasing information from databases, companies employ 
various other methods to gather information about their customers.  For 
example, many retailers use Wi-Fi signals from smart phones to track 
customers who visit their stores, using their movements to learn about 
specific individuals’ behavior.152  All of this information, including any 
biometric information collected by a company, is stored somewhere on a 
database and is generally retained according to company policies.153 
1. Harms to Consumers 
This constant tracking and collection of information poses a myriad of 
potential harms to consumers.  Companies that collect and store 
aggregations of consumer data are at risk for security breaches where 
personal information is accessed by hackers.154  As technology continues 
to evolve, a trend of increased cyber security breaches has emerged.155  In 
2014, a data breach of government databases at the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management led to the theft of an estimated 22 million people’s 
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personal data.156  The breach was historically damaging because of details 
contained in the stolen files,157 including roughly 5.6 million people’s 
fingerprints.158  More recently, the Philippines’ Commission on Elections 
was subject to hackers who accessed a database of 55 million voters in the 
Philippines.159  Described as the largest government-related data breach in 
history,160 the leaked information included “228,605 email addresses; 1.3 
million passport numbers and expiry dates of overseas Filipino voters; and 
15.8 million fingerprint records.”161  Adding insult to injury, a website was 
subsequently created that allowed users to search through the leaked 
information, including names, birth dates, addresses, height and weight, 
passport details, and fingerprint records.162 
In these examples, individuals’ actual fingerprints were not stolen, but 
that does not reduce the potential harms that may follow.  The stored 
fingerprint information was likely authentication codes or templates that 
data from the individual fingerprints were converted into.163  Once stolen, 
this information can be sold to a third party or used to recreate the 
fingerprint.164  As more biometric authentication systems are implemented 
in the private industry, there are more opportunities for hackers to use 
stolen biometric information to bypass or fool supposedly secure 
authentication systems.165  Stolen biometric information can be 
subsequently used for identity theft.  For example, in response to the U.S. 
                                                          
 156.   Tom Iacuzio, Accessing Safety in the Age of Biometrics, THE EMBRY-RIDDLE NEWSROOM 
(Oct. 11, 2016, 5:01 PM), http://news.erau.edu/headlines/accessing-safety-in-the-age-of-biometrics/. 
 157.   Id. 
 158.   Peterson, supra note 7. 
 159.   Stephen Mayhew, Fingerprint and Passport Data Leaked in Philippines Voter Database 
Breach, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201604/ 
fingerprint-and-passport-data-leaked-in-philippines-voter-database-breach. 
 160.   Janvic Mateo, Hackers Release Info on Philippine Voters Online, PHIL. STAR, 
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/04/22/1575585/hackers-release-info-philippine-voters-
online (last updated Apr. 22, 2016, 12:00 AM). 
 161.   James Temperton, The Philippines Election Hack is ‘Freaking Huge’, WIRED (Apr. 14, 
2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/philippines-data-breach-fingerprint-data. 
 162.   Mateo, supra note 160. 
 163.   Anna Myers, Can the U.S. Legal System Adapt to Biometric Technology?, IAPP: PRIVACY 
TECH (Aug. 12, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/can-the-u-s-legal-system-can-adapt-to-biometric-
technology/. 
 164.   Marc Goodman, You Can’t Replace Your Fingerprints, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/future_crimes_excerpt_how_hackers
_can_steal_fingerprints_and_more.html (“To demonstrate this threat, Tsutomu Matsumoto, a security 
researcher at Yokohama National University, has devised a method allowing him to ‘take a photograph 
of a latent fingerprint (on a wineglass, for example)’ and re-create it in molded gelatin.  The technique 
is good enough to fool biometric scanners 80 percent of the time.  Hackers have also used everyday 
child’s Play-Doh to create fingerprint molds good enough to fool 90 percent of fingerprint readers.”). 
 165.   See id. (estimating that thirty percent of businesses will use biometric identification by 
2016). 
658 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
Office of Personnel Management hack, an intra-agency group was tasked 
with investigating the potential for payment fraud and fake identity 
creation using stolen fingerprints.166 
Stolen biometric information poses unique problems for consumers.  
A victim of identity theft can get a new credit card, change their passwords 
and pin numbers, or even change their Social Security number.167  A victim 
of identity theft whose fingerprint data is stolen cannot change their 
fingerprints or get new ones.168  Biometric information is permanently 
associated with a user and once stolen, it is out of the user’s control 
forever.169  A similarly unique problem is the fact that biometric 
information is inherently not a secret.  It is common practice for consumers 
to keep their bank pin numbers a secret, but most people do not regularly 
wipe fingerprints they leave behind.170  Hackers have already used high-
resolution photos and fingerprints left on iPhone screens and other 
surfaces to circumvent fingerprint authentication technologies.171 
This problem is not unique to fingerprints.  A study conducted at 
Carnegie Mellon University used webcams and facial recognition 
technology to identify individuals on campus by linking the information 
gathered to photographs on Facebook.172  About thirty-one percent of the 
students were identified in less than three seconds.173  The researchers 
were also able to infer students’ interests and Social Security numbers by 
combining face recognition with data mining algorithms and statistical re-
identification techniques.174 
Not only do consumers face potential breaches of their personal 
information, but they also have little to no say in what information is 
collected about them.  Under our current federal privacy framework, 
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individuals do not have the explicit right to learn what information is 
collected and stored about them, who holds their personal information, or 
the methods that are used by entities collecting their personal 
information.175  This issue became readily apparent when Facebook 
released its “Tag Suggestions” feature in 2011.176  At first glance, the 
feature was simply a user-friendly tool that provided tagging suggestions 
for individuals in photos uploaded to the website.177  However, Facebook 
would not have been able to launch a tool that automatically identified 
millions of individuals unless it had been operating some form of facial 
recognition biometric software without the knowledge or consent of its 
users.178  The implementation of the “Tag Suggestions” feature was 
possible because of the lack of regulation of biometric information 
collection, and it is still operational because of the difficulty consumers 
face when attempting to sue Facebook without generally applicable 
biometric information privacy laws.179 
Many types of facial recognition biometric software can identify 
individuals from a distance without their knowledge or consent.180  Facial 
recognition technology can be used in closed-circuit television, which can 
record the exact location of individuals.181  Facial recognition can also 
connect photos to Facebook or other social media profiles.182  The 
Department of Homeland Security is developing a Biometric Optical 
Surveillance System that provides face-in-a-crowd detection.183  
Additionally, systems such as Face First allow retailers to identify the 
people entering their stores to assess whether they are likely to shoplift or 
whether they are “good customers.”184 
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An additional harm the collection of biometric information poses is 
the destruction of “intellectual privacy.”185  The term describes “our 
compelling interest in keeping our reading, viewing, and listening 
activities to ourselves—and the complimentary danger that exposure of 
these individual choices will constrain the freedom to explore and 
experiment with ideas and art.”186  Essentially, the risk is the “creation of 
a fishbowl society where a norm of disclosure forces all of us to act as if 
we are being watched at all times.”187  Alan Westin eloquently explained 
this harm in his book Privacy and Freedom: 
[One] state of privacy, anonymity, occurs when the individual is in 
public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom 
from identification and surveillance.  He may be riding a subway, 
attending a ball game, or walking the streets; he is among people and 
knows that he is being observed; but unless he is a well-known celebrity, 
he does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules 
of behavior and role that would operate if he were known to those 
observing him.  In this state the individual is able to merge into the 
“situational landscape.”  Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic 
observation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom 
that men seek in open spaces and public arenas.188 
Businesses already track consumers’ every move online for 
advertising and behavioral analysis purposes.189  Biometric technologies 
would allow them to track us in the real world.190  By incorporating facial 
recognition technology in closed-circuit TV systems, companies will 
possess the capability to instantly identify “individuals walking down the 
street or into a store.”191  Coupled with the pervasive collection of data via 
online activity and in-store interactions,192 individuals’ privacy will suffer.  
The potential harms that consumers face, in addition to the ever-evolving 
technological landscape, create a need for generally applicable legislation 
to regulate the collection of biometric data. 
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2. Lack of Oversight and Regulation 
The FTC has recognized the fact that the growing popularity of data 
collection in private industries has created increased privacy and data 
security concerns for consumers.193  The FTC is perhaps the most equipped 
to handle the unique concerns that the collection of biometric information 
creates, as it has undertaken the role of enforcing privacy and data 
security.194  Private industry’s collection and use of biometric information 
would logically fall within the scope of the FTC’s general data privacy 
enforcement.  However, its current power to regulate is too limited to 
adequately protect consumers.195 
The FTC’s authority to regulate general data privacy arises out of 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “[u]nfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”196  The FTC views the Act as a 
“‘broad consumer protection mandate’ that Congress intended to allow the 
Commission to respond to the ‘unanticipated, unenumerated threats’ 
consumers face in the marketplace.”197  Even if the FTC’s power to 
regulate unfair or deceptive practices is broad, the question of whether the 
FTC’s authority extends to regulating private industry’s collection of 
biometric information is unclear absent clearly granted statutory authority. 
The FTC lacks binding judicial precedent to support its authority to 
regulate the collection of biometric information.  The most significant 
case, Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham, established that data 
security was within the FTC’s authority.198  However, that decision was 
limited in scope and accompanied by many critics.199  In Wyndham, the 
FTC alleged that a hotel chain failed to “maintain reasonable and 
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appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal information,” 
allowing hackers to access the consumers’ information.200  Ultimately, the 
court determined that “the contour of an unfairness claim in the data-
security context, like any other, is necessarily ‘flexible’ such that the FTC 
can apply Section 5 [of the FTC Act] ‘to the facts of particular cases arising 
out of unprecedented situations.’”201  However, this ruling is far from the 
unambiguous authority necessary to regulate biometric information. 
One potential avenue for the FTC to regulate the collection of 
biometric information is through consent orders.  Current FTC 
enforcement of data privacy is largely reliant upon consent orders 
regarding data security practices.202  The consent orders generally contain 
an agreement between the FTC and a business that the business will 
“institute more robust data security procedures and make long-term 
commitments to third party security assessments.”203  Because the consent 
orders are “private actions negotiated between the alleged violators and 
the FTC,” they can be used as fair notice that other companies should 
implement similar practices.204  Additionally, the FTC has announced that 
“in the absence of clear statements to the contrary, a company’s online 
privacy policy would be considered to apply equally to a company’s 
offline collection and use of data.”205  However, this route to regulating 
biometric information is unlikely to be successful.  Outside of BIPA’s 
requirement that businesses publish policies relating to their collection and 
use of biometric information,206 companies have little incentive to include 
biometric-specific language in their online privacy policies. 
Arguments against the FTC’s regulation of data privacy practices posit 
that the FTC’s unfair practices authority does not encompass data security 
and that the matter is better suited for the legislature, which can weigh the 
“costs and benefits of cybersecurity policy.”207  However, biometric 
information collection poses risks that are much higher than general 
information and data security risks.  Biometric characteristics are 
irreplaceable and perhaps most importantly, “they are, by their nature, 
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identifying information.”208  And the FTC is well equipped with 
knowledge and expertise regarding data collection practices: 
[T]he FTC sums the problem up well: “Consumers face a landscape of 
virtually ubiquitous collection of their data.”  And the FTC makes an 
important point to consider when legislating to protect consumer data: 
“Whether such collection occurs online or offline does not alter the 
consumer’s privacy interest in his or her data.”  In the FTC’s report and 
in other industry and privacy advocate reports, there are similarly 
proposed privacy protection measures.  While some suggestions are 
specific as to a particular type of web or mobile applications or 
technology, the proposals all include instituting “privacy by design,” 
which entails: data security measures, reasonable retention and storage 
practices, clear notice and transparency, simplified choices, and 
accountability.209 
The FTC has limited power to regulate private industry’s collection 
and use of biometric information.  Absent explicitly-granted 
Congressional power, the FTC is not currently capable of providing 
adequate protection to consumers.  However, given explicit regulatory 
authority via legislation, the FTC is well equipped to protect consumers 
from violations of their privacy from developing technologies. 
B. Addressing the Problems of Biometric Data 
As discussed above, the United States does not adequately protect 
consumers from the collection and use of their biometric information.  As 
biometric technologies become more popular in the private industry, 
potential harms to consumers become more apparent, such as the risk of 
hackers stealing information from databases and the lack of consumer 
power and access to information regarding what data companies are 
collecting about them and how they use that data.  Current state laws 
governing biometric information are conflicting, and there is no general 
federal law to protect consumers. 
Additionally, the Privacy Shield may protect transatlantic commerce 
for the foreseeable future, but its strength and ability to survive judicial 
scrutiny is questionable.  Digital Rights Ireland, an Irish civil liberties 
group, has already brought a complaint against the Privacy Shield in the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s lower court.210  The challenge 
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seeks “to annul the framework” for allegedly inadequate privacy 
protections.211  If the challenge succeeds and the Privacy Shield is 
annulled, hundreds of companies will again be unsure of their ability to 
continue to conduct data transfers between the United States and the 
European Union.212  However, if the United States provided more robust 
privacy protections through legislation, challenges such as this would not 
affect U.S. business interactions with the European Union, at least so far 
as biometric data transfers are concerned. 
These issues can be resolved with legislative action.  Congress should 
use the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)213 as a template to craft 
adequate biometric privacy laws.  The FTC has experience with data 
protection initiatives and has actively advocated for further protections to 
be afforded to consumers.  The FTC should thus be delegated the power 
to enforce the biometric privacy law and to promulgate rules to further 
protect consumers. 
1. The Fair Credit Reporting Act as a Template 
Protection for consumers’ biometric information will only be as strong 
as the laws or regulations that are put in place to govern the private 
industry’s collection and storage of this sensitive information.  It is fitting 
that the database industry’s roots originate from consumer reporting 
agencies, which are regulated by one of the most comprehensive consumer 
privacy laws in the United States — the Fair Credit Reporting Act.214  This 
section will outline the essential provisions of the FCRA and explain how 
it can be used as a template for a potential biometric information privacy 
law. 
Credit reporting agencies have existed since roughly 1899, but 
controversy surrounding the industry came to a head in the 1960s.215  
Multiple questionable practices existed in the industry, ranging from the 
collection of “lifestyle information” such as sexual orientation and 
drinking habits to the fabrication of negative information in order to fill 
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quotas of negative information on consumers.216  Consumers did not have 
the right to see what was in their files and were unable to correct inaccurate 
information in their credit reports.217  This in turn had a direct impact on 
multiple aspects of consumers’ lives, from their ability to purchase a home 
to their ability to find employment.218  In response to the public outcry 
caused by these practices, Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970.219 
The FCRA regulates consumer reporting agencies and affords 
consumers privacy rights in consumer reports.  A “consumer reporting 
agency” is defined as any person who “regularly engages . . . in the 
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information . . . for 
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .”220  A 
“consumer report” is defined by the Act as any “communication of any 
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s 
credit worthiness . . . credit standing, credit capacity, character, general 
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living” for the purpose of 
determining eligibility for credit, insurance, employment, or other 
authorized purposes under § 1681b.221  Authorized purposes listed in § 
1681b include: 
(1) in response to a court order or grand jury subpoena; (2) to the person 
to whom the report pertains; (3) to a “person which [the agency] has 
reason to believe” intends to use the information in connection with (a) 
the extension of credit to a consumer, (b) employment purposes, (c) 
insurance underwriting, (d) licensing or the conferral of government 
benefits, (e) assessment of credit risks associated with an existing credit 
obligation or (f) a “legitimate business need” when engaging in “a 
business transaction involving the consumer”; (4) to establish a person’s 
capacity to pay child support; (5) to an agency administering a state plan 
for use to set initial or modified child support award; or (6) to the FDIC 
or National Credit Union Administration.222 
The FCRA is worded to be broadly applicable.  If an entity collects 
information for the purposes listed in § 1681b to provide to others, then 
that entity becomes a consumer reporting agency.223  Entities that are not 
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considered traditional consumer reporting agencies can thus be subject to 
the FCRA.  An example of this broad reach is the settlement reached 
between Spokeo and the Federal Trade Commission in 2012 for Spokeo’s 
alleged violations of the FCRA.224  Spokeo is a data broker that “collects 
personal information about consumers,” “create[s] detailed personal 
profiles,” and then sells the profiles to companies.225  The FTC alleged that 
Spokeo marketed these profiles as a tool for employment screening, 
encouraging recruiters to “Explore Beyond the Resume.”226  Because 
Spokeo marketed the profiles to companies in the human resources and 
recruiting industries, it was operating as a consumer reporting agency and 
could thus be held liable for failing to ensure that the profiles were accurate 
and used for legal purposes, and for failing to tell companies about their 
obligations under the FCRA.227 
Spokeo ultimately settled the claim with the FTC, but this case serves 
an example of the FCRA’s malleable scope.  Similarly, a biometric 
information privacy statute should turn on the purposes of companies’ 
collection and use of biometric information.  Instead of applying the 
statute to a specific industry, such as online businesses or data brokers, a 
biometric information privacy statute should be worded to apply broadly 
to any entity that collects and uses biometric information.228  Additionally, 
the definition of biometric information should be broad enough to 
encompass all potential forms of biometric information, instead of 
following BIPA’s example and excluding certain types of biometric 
information such as physical descriptions and photographs.229 
The FCRA also provides safeguards to ensure the accuracy of 
consumer reports.  Specifically, a consumer reporting agency is required 
to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of 
the information concerning the individual about whom the [consumer] 
report relates.”230  Consumers have the ability to dispute the completeness 
or accuracy of the information in the report, and the agency must 
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reinvestigate and fix any errors found, free of charge.231  If the dispute is 
not resolved, the consumer can file a statement about the dispute that must 
be provided with and specifically noted in subsequent consumer reports 
by the agency.232 
Upon a consumer’s request, consumer reporting agencies are required 
to disclose, among other things, “[a]ll information in the consumer’s file 
at the time of the request, except . . . any information concerning credit 
scores or any other risk scores or predictors relating to the consumer” as 
well as the source of the information and a list of each entity who obtained 
a consumer report.233  If an end-user of a consumer report takes an adverse 
action regarding a consumer, then the user must provide notice to the 
consumer and provide information for the consumer to contact the 
consumer reporting agency that prepared the report.234  Consumers can 
thus gain knowledge of the information that is collected about them.  A 
provision such as this is vital to a biometric information privacy statute 
because consumers are generally unaware of the information that is 
collected about them by private industries.235 
The FCRA also has multiple provisions to protect consumers from 
identity theft and fraud.  When a consumer alerts one consumer reporting 
agency of potential fraud, that agency must notify the other consumer 
reporting agencies.236  Victims of identity theft can require creditors to 
disclose information about the fraudulent transactions completed in the 
individual’s name.237  Identity theft victims can block the reporting of 
information related to the identity theft.238  An identity theft provision in a 
biometric information privacy statute should also provide extensive 
protections for consumers.  Because biometric information is inherent to 
individuals and cannot be changed, identity theft is a primary concern that 
must be addressed in the statute.239 
Finally, the FCRA provides a private cause of actions for consumers.  
An entity who “willfully fails to comply with any requirement” of the 
FCRA is liable to the consumer for actual damages or damages between 
$100 and $1,000, as well as punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and 
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costs.240  Negligent failure to comply with any requirement of the FCRA 
results in liability to the consumer for actual damages as well as attorneys’ 
fees and costs.241  The FTC also has the power to enforce the FCRA.242 
2. The Result 
The problems that biometric information pose to consumers and the 
lack of protection currently available mirror the concerns that led to the 
enactment of GINA.  Just as with GINA, the current federal law governing 
the collection and use of biometric information is incomplete and does not 
provide substantive protections to consumers.243  State laws such as BIPA 
and CUBI vary on the approach taken to regulating biometric information 
and the level of protection they provide.244  The state laws differing 
definitions of biometric information may be confusing to companies that 
conduct business online, and do not protect the general public from the 
myriad of potential harms that the collection of biometric information will 
inevitably pose.245 
The biometric privacy legislation that this Comment proposes is based 
on the FCRA.  By using the FCRA’s basic provisions as a template for a 
new law regulating the private industry’s collection and use of biometric 
data, a biometric privacy framework can be crafted that will provide 
adequate protections to U.S. consumers.  Additionally, by delegating 
enforcement of the biometric privacy framework to the FTC, the FTC will 
be able to expand upon its ability to regulate data privacy issues. 
The biometric privacy statute (BPS) should initially set out a broad 
definition of biometrics.  By using a technology-neutral definition and 
instead focusing on the type of data that is collected by biometric 
technologies, the framework will provide a flexible standard that can be 
applied to new and evolving technologies developed in the future.246  The 
BPS should also use a broad term to cover potential collectors and users 
of biometric information, such as “biometric data collectors.”  This will 
ensure that the framework does not apply to a single industry, such as cable 
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records or medical records.247  Instead, it will apply to any entity that 
collects biometric information, much like the FCRA applied to Spokeo 
even though it was not considered a traditional consumer reporting agency. 
The BPS should also set out specific authorized purposes that the 
collected information can be used for.  This will provide consumers with 
the knowledge of how their biometric information is used.  Procedures 
concerning maximum accuracy and safety of biometric information 
databases248 should be included, as well as provisions ensuring 
transparency.  These requirements can be modeled on BIPA.  Like BIPA, 
the BPS should prohibit companies from profiting from an individual’s 
biometric information and should require companies to publish privacy 
policies concerning biometric information collection, retention, and 
deletion.249 
Additionally, the BPS should require mandatory disclosures to 
consumers upon request and mandatory notice to a consumer if his or her 
biometric information is used to take an adverse action.  Consumers should 
also be provided with the ability to dispute the accuracy of biometric 
information kept about them, opt-out of collection of biometrics, and 
remove their biometrics from a database.  The option for complete removal 
of biometric information does not parallel any provision of the FCRA, 
however, the sensitive nature of biometric information must be 
protected.250  It is individual to each consumer, and as such consumers 
should have the option to protect themselves by completely removing their 
biometric information from databases.251 
Identity theft and fraud provisions like those in the FCRA will be 
beneficial not only to consumers, but also to businesses.  Identity theft and 
fraud pose even greater risks to consumers’ biometric information because 
of its uniqueness and permanence.252  Once a fingerprint is stolen, it cannot 
be changed like a password or a pin number.  The BPS should thus require 
biometric data collectors to disclose any breaches in security to consumers 
and to any other relevant entities.  Additionally, the BPS should require 
biometric data collectors to develop a plan for action after a security 
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breach and mandate security diagnostics procedures so that biometric data 
collectors will catch the security holes and ensure they are fixed. 
The BPS should preempt all state laws.  This will establish a single, 
generally applicable law governing the collection and use of biometric 
information in the United States.  As previously discussed, BIPA and 
CUBI do not take the same approach to regulating biometric information 
and provide differing levels of protection.253  By preempting these and 
future state laws governing biometric information, the BPS will eradicate 
confusion caused by multiple laws and will provide businesses with 
consistent regulations.254 
Finally, the BPS should provide a private cause of action for 
consumers and also delegate enforcement power to the FTC.  Consumers 
will thus be able to procure damages for breaches of the BPS, while the 
FTC will regulate biometric data collection practices as a whole.  The FTC 
will no longer have to rely on consent orders as the principal method to 
regulate privacy and security issues.255  In fact, the FTC will be able to 
better implement the plans that FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez outlined 
in her keynote address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum in 
August 2016.256  In her speech, Ramirez outlined three ways the FTC 
intends to empower consumers and ensure they have control over personal 
data.257  First, the FTC will “continue its research and policymaking efforts 
to . . . keep pace with innovation.”258  Second, the FTC will use its 
“authority to make sure companies are protecting consumer privacy and 
safeguarding consumer data.”259  And third, the FTC will foster innovation 
and incentivize companies to develop new privacy tools.260 
Combining the FTC’s enforcement power with a general biometric 
privacy framework will ensure that companies are transparent about their 
data practices, improve consumers’ ability to manage the information that 
is collected about them, and safeguard biometric databases from potential 
breaches in security.  The framework will fit seamlessly into the United 
States’ sectoral privacy laws but will afford broader protection to 
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consumers by providing a flexible standard that will cover any entity that 
collects and uses biometric information. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States does not adequately protect consumers from the 
collection and use of their biometric information.  Biometric information 
is unlike other personal information because it is unique to each individual 
and cannot be changed or altered.  As biometric technologies become more 
popular in the private industry, the need for regulation has grown.  
Biometric information collection puts consumers at risk to identity thefts 
and hackers.  Stolen biometric information has the potential to damage 
consumers in ways that normal identity thefts do not because of the unique 
nature of biometric characteristics.  The current federal framework 
provides almost no protection for consumers’ biometric information.  
While state statutes such as BIPA provide some protection, that protection 
does not necessarily extend to out of state consumers and can lead to vast 
class actions and a wide range of potential damages and causes of action.  
Additionally, the United States’ current privacy regime does not afford 
adequate privacy protections to EU citizens.  While the Privacy Shield will 
protect transatlantic commerce between the United States and the 
European Union for the foreseeable future, its strength and ability to 
survive judicial scrutiny is questionable. 
These issues can be resolved with legislative action that implements 
the biometric privacy statute outlined above.  The FCRA can be used as a 
template to craft adequate biometric privacy laws.  The FTC should be 
given the power to enforce the framework because it has experience with 
data protection initiatives and has actively advocated for further 
protections to be afforded to consumers.  The biometric privacy 
framework will provide sufficient privacy protections to consumers, allow 
them to better understand biometric data collection practices, and ensure 
they will not remain in the dark about the information that companies have 
collected regarding their biometric characteristics. 
 
